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THE IMPACT OF THE ABOLITION
OF TAX CREDIT ON EX-DIVIDEND DAY
ABNORMAL RETURNS
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) MARKET
Hardo Basuki
The ex-dividend day returns are composed of the capital gains
component and the dividends component. This study mainly exam-
ines the relationship between the 1997 abolition of the tax-credit and
the ex-dividend day abnormal stock returns in the UK market
(London Stock Exchange). The 1997 abolition of the tax credit on
dividend effectively reduced the income of pension funds and other
tax-exempt shareholders who had a strong preference for dividends.
This study finds that the ex-day abnormal returns (AR) declined
from +0.0580 percent during the pre-abolition periods to -0.1459
percent during the post-abolition periods. This decline is statistically
significant with a t-value of 2.0431. From these results it would
appear that the ex-dividend day AR changed following the 1997
abolition of tax credits on dividends.
Moreover the comparison tests of ex-day drop-off ratios be-
tween pre-and post-abolition periods show that drop-off ratios for all
dividend yield groups increased significantly from 0.519 in the pre-
abolition periods to 0.574 over the post-abolition periods with a t-
value of 2.183. Thus, the decrease on ex-day AR was further
supported by a significant increase in the average price-drop to
dividend ratios.
The decline in the ex-day AR for the post-abolition periods
seems to be driven primarily by quintile 5 (the highest dividend yield
quintile). Quintile 5 exhibits strong dividend preference and this
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Introduction
In July 1997 a major change in the
tax arrangements relating to dividends
was introduced by the British govern-
ment. The government abolished the
tax-credit on the net dividends received
by pension funds and other tax exempt
institutional shareholders. In his bud-
get speech of 2 July 1997, Mr. Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, stated:
“The present system of tax-credits
encourages companies to pay out
dividends rather than reinvest their
profits. This cannot be the best way
of encouraging investment for the
long term as was acknowledged by
the last government. Many pension
funds are in substantial surplus and
at present many companies are en-
joying pension holidays, so this is
the right time to undertake long-
needed reform. So, with immediate
effect, I propose to abolish tax cred-
its paid to pension funds and com-
panies.” [Brown 1997. Budget state-
ment. HANSARD-Parliamentary
Debate, House of Commons Offi-
cial Report 297 (33): 306].
Pension Funds are tax-exempt and
prior to the change they received a
refund (tax credits) on their dividend
incomes. The tax credits did, of course,
reduce the tax revenues of the UK
(United Kingdom) government as they
effectively represented a refund to
shareholders of part of companies’
corporation tax. The ‘imputation sys-
tem’ provided a tax advantage to the
pension funds and other tax exempt
shareholders which may have encour-
aged dividend payments at the expense
of reinvested funds.
For any dividends paid on or after
2 July 1997, pension providers and
most UK corporate shareholders (in-
cluding authorised unit trusts) would
no longer be entitled to payment of the
related tax credit. The UK government
also eliminated ACT (advance corpo-
ration tax) refunds for other zero-rate
taxpayers starting in 1999. However,
tax credits were to continue for chari-
ties and some other tax exempt institu-
tions until 1999 when they were pro-
posed to be gradually eliminated over
a period of five years. Another
government’s proposal would reduce
the rate of the tax credit for other
preference is likely caused  by the  imputation system that provides
a tax advantage to the tax exempt shareholders. This finding appears
to suggest that the highest dividend yield securities are likely to be
held by tax-exempt investors such as pension funds that were
affected by the abolition of the tax credits on dividend.
203
Basuki —The Impact of the Abolition of Tax Credit on ...
shareholders from 20 percent to 10
percent in 1999. At the same time, the
government proposed decreasing the
corporate tax rate from 33 percent to
31 percent.
Bond et al. (1995) claim that the
imputation tax system had introduced
some distortions that were likely to
have some effect on the level of divi-
dend payments by UK companies. Fol-
lowing the introduction of the imputa-
tion system in 1973, many companies
responded by substantially increasing
their dividends. Tax-exempt investors
such as pension funds are the most
influential stockholders in many UK
companies and their tax preference for
dividends may have instigated the
higher dividend payments.
The 1997 abolition of the tax credit
on dividend aimed to remove a per-
ceived distortion in the tax system that
encouraged the distribution of earn-
ings as dividends rather than their re-
tention for investment purposes. High
dividend payouts may reduce the avail-
ability of a relatively low-cost internal
source of funds, and this could de-
crease the level of investment expen-
ditures. Hence, the UK government
attempted to use the tax system to try
to encourage lower dividends and
larger reinvestment of corporate earn-
ings. At the same time, the removal of
the tax credit would substantially in-
crease government’s tax revenues.
Since institutional investors are
relatively less taxed than individual
investors, dividends induce ownership
clientele effects. Tax exempt institu-
tions such as pension funds and chari-
ties are the primary shareholders of
dividend-paying firms. Allen et al.
(2000) re-examined the importance of
tax clienteles on a firm’s dividend
policy in light of the increasing num-
ber of tax-exempt institutional inves-
tor in the market. One reason for these
institutions to hold dividend-paying
shares is the restrictions such as ‘pru-
dent man rule’ that make it more diffi-
cult for many institutions to buy shares
with low dividends or no dividends.
Companies are keen to attract institu-
tional investors to their equity and
institutional investors will become the
corresponding marginal investors in
such shares.
In the UK market, before the 1997
tax reform institutional investors ben-
efited from a tax credit, thus further
encouraging them to seek out high
dividend payout firms to invest in.
According to Allen et al. (2000), insti-
tutional investors can use their block
holdings to influence corporate deci-
sions and increase or maintain the divi-
dend payment in their favor. Since the
tax-exempt investors are the most sig-
nificant investors in many UK compa-
nies, their tax preference for dividends
may have had an important impact on
corporate dividend policy. Motivated
by the theory of dividends developed
by Allen et al. this examines the im-
pact of the 1997 tax change on corpo-
rate dividend policy and by so doing is
also able to assess the influence of the
institutional investors.
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In addition, the traditional differ-
ential taxation of dividends and capi-
tal gains has generated controversy
with regard to valuation of the firm’s
equity and the setting of the firm’s
dividend policy. If corporate manag-
ers perceive investors to have tax-in-
duced preferences that may influence
the valuation of equity, then changes
in the effective taxation of dividends
and/or capital gains should affect cor-
porate dividend policy. The 1997 abo-
lition of tax-credit on dividends to tax-
exempt institutions provides a clear
opportunity to test whether taxes af-
fect corporate dividend policy.
The Taxation of Dividends in
the United Kingdom (UK)
From 1973 to 1997 the UK gov-
ernment operated an imputation tax
system of corporation tax under which
some tax relief on dividend income
was provided to all stockholders in
recognition of corporation tax paid by
the company. In effect, part of corpo-
ration tax counted as the basic rate of
income tax on dividends paid to share-
holders.
Under the imputation system, cor-
poration tax is payable in two install-
ments. The first payment, Advance
Corporation Tax (ACT), is made soon
after the companies pay their divi-
dends and is based on the amount of
the dividends paid. This is treated as
income tax on the dividends paid, hence
the recipients of the dividends receive
a tax credit. The rate of ACT was set
equal to basic rate of income tax from
1973, and then the lower band rate of
income tax from 1994. For example, in
1998, advance corporation tax (ACT)
was paid at a rate of 20 percent on the
notional gross dividend received by a
shareholder. The second payment of
corporate tax, Mainstream Corpora-
tion Tax (MCT), is payable approxi-
mately 9 months after the end of the
firm’s accounting period. The com-
pany subtracts the ACT (the first pay-
ment) from its total corporation tax
liability, and pays the difference in
MCT.
Therefore, under the imputation
system, the dividend comes with a tax
credit. A basic rate tax payer in receipt
of dividends is deemed to have paid
the income tax due, i.e. the ACT counts
as basic rate income tax paid. A higher
tax rate payer is required to pay the
difference between higher rate tax and
basic rate tax (lower band rate from
1994) on all dividends received. Tax
exempt shareholders receive a tax re-
fund equal to the tax credit. The sig-
nificant change in 1997 meant that
some tax exempt shareholders would
no longer receive this ‘tax refund.’
Table 1 shows the income tax
rates in the UK from 1987. In 1988, the
UK government abolished all rates of
income tax above 40 percent, taking
the top rate from 60 percent to 40
percent.
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Table 2. Comparison of Dividend Income Under the Imputation Tax System
and the Classical Tax System
Basic Top Exempt Basic Top Exempt
Year Rate Rate m= 0 Year Rate Rate m= 0
m= 20 m= 40 percent m= 20 m= 40 percent
percent percent percent percent
1996 1996
(t
C
=33 £ 670.0 £ 502.5 £ 837.5 (t
C
=33 £ 536.0 £ 402.0 £ 670.0
percent) percent)
1997 1997
(t
C
=31 £ 690.0 £ 517.5 £ 862.5 (t
C
=31 £ 552.0 £ 414.0 £ 690.0
percent) percent)
Table 1. UK Corporate Tax Rates, Dividend Income Tax Rates  and
Tax Credit Rates (1987-1999)
Corporate Tax Credit
Year Tax Rate Lower Rate* Top Rate Exempt Rate
(t
C
) (Basic Rate) (s)
1987 35 percent 27 percent 60 percent 0 percent 27 percent
1988 35 percent 25 percent 40 percent 0 percent 25 percent
1989 35 percent 25 percent 40 percent 0 percent 25 percent
1990 35 percent 25 percent 40 percent 0 percent 25 percent
1991 33 percent 25 percent 40 percent 0 percent 25 percent
1992 33 percent 25 percent 40 percent 0 percent 25 percent
1993 33 percent 25 percent 40 percent 0 percent 25 percent
1994 33 percent 20 percent 40 percent 0 percent 20 percent
1995 33 percent 20 percent 40 percent 0 percent 20 percent
1996 33 percent 20 percent 40 percent 0 percent 20 percent
1997 31 percent 20 percent 40 percent 0 percent 20 percent
1998 31 percent 20 percent 40 percent 0 percent 20 percent
1999 30 percent 10 percent 33 percent 0 percent 10 percent
* The rate of ACT was set equal to lower band rate from 1994 (previously basic rate).
Dividend Income that would be received
 by shareholders under
the IMPUTATION SYSTEM (s=20 percent)
£ 1000*(1-t
C
)*(1-m) /(1-s)
Dividend Income that would be received
by shareholders under
the CLASSICAL SYSTEM
£ 1000*(1-t
C
)*(1-m)
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Under the UK imputation system,
the firm decides on a net dividend to be
paid out to the shareholders. The firm
pays ACT on a ‘notional’ gross divi-
dend, and this counts as income tax
paid by the shareholders. The gross
dividend is simply the net dividend
grossed up by the amount of ACT. The
net dividend received by shareholders
is accompanied with a tax credit from
the government for the tax paid. Share-
holders receive a net dividend plus a
tax credit equal to the imputation rate
times gross dividends. If the share-
holder is a basic rate taxpayer the tax
liability is fully cancelled out by the
tax credit and no further tax is payable.
A higher rate taxpayer needs to pay
additional tax, equal to tax at the higher
rate on the gross dividend less the tax
credit. The net dividend income for
shareholders, after all taxes, can be
derived:
where t
C
 and m are as in equation (1),
and s = the imputation tax rate.
For basic rate tax payers, m= s,
and net dividend income reduces to:
£1,000 (1 - t
C
)            (3)
For tax exempt shareholders where
m= 0, the net dividend income is:
£1,000 (1 - t
C
)*                    (2)
(1 - m)
(1 - s)
The basic rate of income tax was
cut from 30 percent to 29 percent in
1986, then to 27 percent in 1987 and to
25 percent in 1988. In 1993, the Con-
servative government cut the tax credit
(ACT) from 25 percent to 20 percent.
In 1997, the Labor government planned
to reduce the tax credit rate from 20
percent to 10 percent starting in 1999,
while abolishing it altogether with
immediate effect for tax-exempt fi-
nancial institutions and corporations.
The government also reduced the top
corporate tax rate to 31 percent in
1997.
Table 2 compares the dividend
income received by shareholders un-
der the imputation tax system, and that
which would be received under a clas-
sical system of corporate taxes. Sup-
pose a company has £1,000 of pre-tax
profits to be distributed as dividends.
Under the classical system, the
net dividend income for shareholders
is:
£1,000(1-t
C
)(1-m)           (1)
where t
C
 = the rate of corporation tax
and, m= the shareholder’s rate of in-
come tax.
Hence, the company pays corpo-
ration tax at the rate t
C
, and the remain-
der is paid in dividends on which the
shareholder pays income tax on at the
rate, m. In 1996, therefore, with a rate
of corporation tax of 33 percent, tax-
exempt shareholders (e.g., pension
funds) would receive net dividend in-
come after all taxes of £670 [=£1,000*
(1-0.33)*(1-0 percent)].
£1,000                                 (4)
(1 - t
C
)
(1 - s)
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For a firm that has £1,000 to be de-
voted to dividends after corporation
tax of 33 percent, it follows that the
basic rate tax payer has net dividend
income of £670, the higher rate tax-
payer (m = 40 percent) has net divi-
dend income of £502.50, and the tax
exempt shareholder gets £837.5.
Net dividend incomes under the
imputation and the classical systems
are presented in Table 2. The impact of
the decrease in corporation tax to 31
percent, 1997, is also shown. The lower
the rate of corporation tax, ceteris pari-
bus, the greater the dividend income
received by the shareholders. If we
compare the dividend incomes under
the two tax regimes, it can be seen that
the dividend incomes under the impu-
tation system are greater than the divi-
dends under the classical system, es-
sentially because the distributed prof-
its (dividends) under the classical sys-
tem are subject to double taxation (cor-
poration tax plus income tax).
With corporation tax at 33 per-
cent the firm in the example pays a net
dividend of £670. Under the imputa-
tion system the notional gross divi-
dend is £837.50. ACT is 20 percent of
£837.50, equal to £167.50. We have
the following definitions:
Net Dividend
Gross Dividend = (5)
1 - s
Net Dividend =
       Gross Dividend x (1 - s) (6)
We have seen that a higher rate
tax-payer is liable for more tax over
and above the tax credit, and the tax
exempt shareholder receives a refund
equal to the tax credit. The higher rate
taxpayer is liable to tax at 40 percent of
the gross dividend of £837.50, which
is £335. With a tax credit of £167.50
the shareholder must pay a further
£167.50. This represents 25 percent of
the net dividend of £670, so the effec-
tive rate of tax on the net dividend
received is 25 percent for the higher
rate (m = 40 percent) taxpayer. The tax
exempt shareholder receives a refund
of £167.50 so the effective rate of tax
on net dividends received is -25 per-
cent. The general formula for the ef-
fective rate of tax on the net dividend
received can be derived as follow:
where d = net dividend
Under the imputation tax system,
different types of stockholders may
have different tax preferences for or
against dividends. If a firm retains
profits as an alternative to paying a
dividend, this should be capitalised in
share price. If this represents a capital
gain for shareholders then it is taxable
(when the gain is realized). The ques-
(7)
m -      s
d
1-s
d
1-s
d =
(dm - ds)
d
1-s
d
m - s
1 - s
=
Effective tax rate on net dividend =
(tax payable of gross dividend - tax
credit)/net dividend =
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tion is whether shareholders have a tax
preference for dividends or capital
gains. Assuming the retained earnings
are fully capitalised in share price, and
is subject to capital gains tax, we can
make a comparison as follows. The
alternatives are to pay a net dividend
or to retain this amount in the firm. If
the rate of capital gains tax is z and
stockholders have a capital gain of £1,
then the after-tax amount received is
(1-z). £1 of net dividend provides after
tax income of (1- m)/(1- s). In this
situation, shareholders should prefer
dividends only if the value of after-tax
dividend is greater than the value of
after-tax capital gain, that is {(1- m)/
(1- s)}> (1- z). On the contrary, capital
gains will be preferred to dividends if:
(1 - z) >{(1 - m) / (1 - s)}. (Chui et al.
1992).
Assuming that the stockholder’s
effective rate of capital gain tax is zero
(e.g., realization of capital gain is de-
layed indefinitely), we can compare
the value of after-tax dividend or the
ratio (1- m) /(1- s) with 1 (one). If the
value of this ratio is larger than one,
this indicates a tax incentive to receive
dividends. Conversely, if the value of
this ratio is less than one, this indicates
a tax incentive to receive capital gains,
or in other words, a value less than one
indicates a tax preference against divi-
dends. The ratio value of one indicates
indifference between dividends or capi-
tal gains.
Table 3 shows the value of the
ratio (1- m)/(1- s) for three types of
shareholders during the period 1985–
1999. From the three types of share-
holders, it is clear that tax-exempt
shareholders such as pension funds
will have a strong preference for divi-
dends since the value of the ratios were
greater than one. Basic-rate stockhold-
ers would be indifferent over the pe-
riod because the marginal rate of per-
sonal income tax on dividend income
is set equal to the rate of imputation
(m= s). On the other hand, the top-rate
shareholders have a preference against
dividend payments.
Table 3. Tax Preference For and
Against Dividends 1985-
1999
Tax Preference For Dividend (>1)
and Against Dividend (<1)
Ratio : (1-m)/(1-s)
Year Exempt Basic Top
Rate Rate
1985 1.43 1 0.57
1986 1.41 1 0.56
1987 1.37 1 0.55
1988 1.33 1 0.80
1989 1.33 1 0.80
1990 1.33 1 0.80
1991 1.33 1 0.80
1992 1.33 1 0.80
1993 1.29 1 0.77
1994 1.25 1 0.75
1995 1.25 1 0.75
1996 1.25 1 0.75
1997 1 1 0.75
1998 1 1 0.75
1999 1 1 0.66
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It is interesting to note that table 3
shows the decline in the incentive to
receive dividend income for tax-ex-
empt stockholders. The value of the
ratio for tax-exempt shareholders de-
creased from 1.43 in 1985 to 1 in 1997.
The decrease in the basic rate of in-
come tax has reduced the imputation
rate, and hence lowered the value of
the tax credit paid out to the tax-ex-
empt shareholders, until it disappeared
altogether in 1997. From July 1997,
pension funds and most of the UK
corporate shareholders (including au-
thorized unit trusts) have been no longer
be entitled to the payment of the re-
lated tax credit. Thus, the incentive to
receive dividend for tax-exempt share-
holders has declined significantly.
Table 4 shows the effective rate of
income tax on dividends received by
shareholders under the imputation tax
system before and after the 1997 abo-
lition of tax credit on dividends. Be-
fore the abolition the effective rate is
given by Equation (7). Following the
abolition the tax-exempt institutions
were treated, with respect to dividend
income, in the same way as basic rate
taxpayers, i.e. no tax refund and no
further tax to pay, effective rate= 0
percent. The effective rate for higher
rate taxpayers remained the same.
Taxes on capital gains are not assumed
to be zero, but the same as income tax
rates which is the prevailing system in
the UK. However, the effective rates
on capital gains are likely to be lower
than the income tax rate because capi-
tal gains are taxed only on realization,
there are benefits from deferring the
payment, and various allowances and
indexation rules apply (Lasfer 1995).
For example, in 1999, each of a hus-
band and wife ‘living together’ benefit
from the annual capital gains exemp-
tion of £ 7,100 when shares are sold. A
shareholder is also entitled to an in-
dexation allowance, which provides
protection from the effect of inflation.
As we can see the 1997 abolition
of the tax credit has decreased the
attractiveness of dividend income rela-
tive to capital gains for the group of
Table 4. Effective Rate of Income Tax on Net Dividend Received Before and
After the 1997 Abolition of the Tax Credit on Dividend
Effective Rates of Income Tax on Net Dividend Received
Before the Abolition After the Abolition
of Tax Credit of Tax Credit
Shareholders Dividend Capital Gain Dividend Capital
Income Tax Tax Income Tax Gain Tax
Tax-exempt -25 percent 0 percent 0 percent 0 percent
Basic rate 0 percent 23 percent 0 percent  23 percent
Top rate 25 percent 40 percent 25 percent 40 percent
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shareholders whose dividend incomes
were not taxed. These shareholders,
most notably the pension funds, expe-
rienced a sharp increase in their effec-
tive tax rates on net dividends received,
i.e. from -25 percent to zero. However,
this significant tax change will not
necessarily induce those shareholders
to shift their preferences from divi-
dends toward capital gains since the
tax preference ratio {(1-m)/(1-s)} is
equal to one. Thus, they should now be
indifferent between capital gains and
dividends.
The Objective of the Study
Under market imperfections, the
study of corporate dividend policy has
long been the subject of theoretical
and empirical research. Any change in
an imperfection may lead to a shift in
the market equilibrium, and this pro-
vides an opportunity to test equilib-
rium theories. One such event is the
1997 abolition of the tax-credit on
dividends for tax exempt shareholders
such as pension funds. Through the
abolition of tax credit paid to pension
funds and companies, combined with
a decrease in the corporate tax burden
from 33 percent to 31 percent in 1997,
the United Kingdom government at-
tempted to use the tax system to en-
courage lower dividends and higher
reinvestment. The 1997 abolition of
the tax credit on dividends, therefore
presents a changing tax scenario in
which theories of dividend can be tested
empirically. The objective of this re-
search is to examine the impact of the
1997 abolition of the dividend tax credit
on ex-dividend day abnormal stock
returns.
The Literature Review
If a share is purchased on the day
before the ex-dividend day (the last
cum-dividend day), the buyer will re-
ceive the dividend on the payment day.
However, if the share is purchased on
the ex-dividend day, the buyer will not
receive the dividend. Therefore, the
ex-dividend price should be lower than
the cum-dividend price to reflect the
lost dividend. In prefect capital mar-
kets, the share-price drop should equal
the dividend per share.
The theoretical analysis of share
price behavior around the ex-dividend
day compares the expected share-price
drop to the dividend per share. A share-
price drop may provides arbitrage profit
for buying (selling) on the cum-divi-
dend day and selling (buying) on the
ex-dividend day. Since investors are
interested in after-tax returns, dif-
ferential taxation of dividends and capi-
tal gains should affect the analysis.
If a shareholder were to sell her
share before it goes ex-dividend, she
would receive P
cum 
(price before the
share goes ex-dividend) minus the tax
on any capital gain [z(P
cum 
- P
o 
)]; where
P
o
 is original price. If she were to sell
the stock after it goes ex-dividend
(price= P
ex
), her wealth would be equal
to dividend income after tax [d (1- m)]
plus the after tax return on the sale of
the share [P
ex 
- z (P
ex 
-
 
P
o
)]. Elton and
Gruber (1970) show that under the
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classical system, stockholders are in-
different between buying or selling
stocks before or after the ex-dividend
day if these two days’ after-tax returns
are equal:
P
cum 
- Z (P
cum
 - P
0
) =
P
ex 
- Z (P
ex
 - P
0
) + d (1 - m) (8)
where:
P
cum
= price of a share before it goes
ex-dividend
P
o  
= original purchase price
P
ex  
= price of a share after it goes ex-
dividend
z = the capital gain tax rate
m = the marginal tax rate on divi-
dend income
d = the amount of dividend
Elton and Gruber point out that
when there is a tax penalty on divi-
dends (m
 
>
 
z), the share price drop
(P
cum 
-
 
P
ex
) on the ex-day is less than the
dividend amount (d). In this case, the
observed ex-day returns are abnormally
positive. Consider an individual in-
vestor who faces tax rates on capital
gains of z and on dividend incomes of
m, where m
 
>
 
z. If we assume that
transaction costs are zero, the ex-day
return (before tax) of the investor for a
strategy of buying cum-dividend and
selling ex-dividend is:
and this return will be positive if the
price decline (P
cum 
-
 
P
ex
) on ex-divi-
dend day is less than the amount of the
dividend (d ), or after-tax returns is:
This result shows that the observed
ex-day returns are positive since the
tax rate on dividend incomes (m) is
greater than the tax rate on capital
gains (z).
Lasfer (1995) develops a model
based on study by Elton and Gruber
above, and relates ex-dividend day
returns to differential taxation of capi-
tal gains and dividends in the UK.
Under the UK imputation system, his
model is as follows:
where d is the dividend net of the tax
credit deducted at company level at
rate s.
Rearranging equation (11) above,
we get the ex-dividend day drop-off
ratio (DoR 
ex
):
The indifference equation (11) can
also be arranged to yield ex-dividend
day return (R
ex
); buying a share before
it goes ex-dividend and selling it after
the ex-dividend day:
P
cum 
- z (P
cum 
- P
0
) =
P
ex
 - z (P
ex
 - P
0
) + d (11)
1 - m
1 - s
R= (9)
(P
ex
 - P
cum
) + d
P
cum
DoR
ex
=               =
P
cum 
- P
ex
d
(1
 
- m)
(1 - s) (1 - z)
(12)
R=          1
 
-                > 0 (10)
 d           (1 - m)
P
cum      
     (1 - z)
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In a rational market, the fall in price on
the ex-dividend day should reflect the
value of dividend vis-à-vis capital gain
to the stockholders. Since dividends
and capital gains are taxable at differ-
ent rates, the relative tax rate on these
two types of income affect the deci-
sion. The terms on the right-hand side
of equations (12) and (13) above re-
flect the tax differential between capi-
tal gains and dividends. Under the tax
hypothesis, ex-dividend day returns
are negatively correlated with the capi-
tal gain tax rate (z) and the tax credit
(s), but positively related to dividend
yield (d/P
cum
) and the personal income
tax rate (m). In this situation, for a tax-
exempt shareholder, such as a pension
fund, whose marginal income tax rate
and capital gain tax are equal to zero
(m = z = 0), the drop-off ratio will be
higher than one and the ex-dividend
day returns will be negative.
Many of the ex-dividend day share
price behavior studies consider tax re-
forms during a sample period. Lasfer
(1995) examined share price behavior
on ex-dividend days before and after
tax reform of 1988 in the United King-
dom. The introduction of the 1988
Income and Corporation Taxes Act
reduced substantially the tax differen-
tial between capital gains and divi-
dends in the UK. He finds that in the
pre-1988 period, ex-dividend day re-
turns were positive and significant
while in the post-1988 period, ex-divi-
dend day returns were negative and
insignificant. He concludes that ex-
dividend day share prices were af-
fected by taxes but not by short-term
trading.
Bell and Jenkinson (2002) ana-
lyze the ex-day share prices behavior
before and after the Finance Act 1997
in the United Kingdom. The main ef-
fect of this tax reform was to abolish
the right of pension fund to be repaid
the tax credit on dividend paid on or
after 2 July 1997. The pension funds
experienced 20 percent drop in the
value of their net dividend income on
UK equities. They tested the hypoth-
esis that price-drop-to-dividend ratio
(DOR) declined significantly after the
Finance Act 1997 since the pension
funds were the marginal investors in
the UK equities and dividend taxes
affected equities values. To test this
hypothesis, they compared estimated
drop-off ratios before and after the
Finance Act 1997 using the following
regression model:
1 - (13)
    (1
 
- m)           d
(1 - s) (1 - z)    P
cum
R
ex
=                    =
P
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+ d - P
cum
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  D
  P
c   i
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P
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     P
c         i
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  D
  P
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where:
P
c
= the cum-dividend price of a share
(before it goes ex-dividend)
P
ex
= price of a share after it goes ex-
dividend
D = the dividend per share
 = error terms
The drop-off ratios are estimated
as the slope coefficient in the regres-
sion model. The tax-induced change is
incorporated in this model by using an
interactive zero-one dummy (Post Fi-
nance Act 1997) for whether or not the
observation declines during the Post
FA 97 periods. The null hypothesis of

FA
= 0 is tested against the alternative
hypothesis of 
FA
< 0. If the null hy-
pothesis is rejected, this result indi-
cates that the drop-off ratios changed
following the Finance Act 1997. Bell
and Jenkinson find significant changes
in price-drop-to-dividend ratio (DOR),
especially for high dividend yield firms.
Before the Finance Act 1997 (FA97),
there was a strong preference of pen-
sion funds for dividend income. The
reductions in average DORs of 13 per-
cent to 28 percent provides strong evi-
dence that pension funds were the ef-
fective marginal investors for high-
yielding firms, and that taxation influ-
ences the valuation of firms.
The Hypothesis
The 1997 abolition of the tax credit
has important implications for the
analysis of ex-dividend day returns.
The substantial increase in the effec-
tive rate of tax on dividends received
by tax-exempt institutional investors,
from -25 percent to zero, provides an
ideal opportunity to examine ex-divi-
dend day stock returns behavior.
The ex-dividend day return (R
ex
)
from a strategy of buying a share be-
fore it goes ex-dividend and selling it
after the ex-dividend day is composed
of a dividends component and a capital
gain (loss) component. The equation
is:
Alternatively, the rate of return on the
ex-dividend day can be written as fol-
lows:
DOR is defined as the ‘drop-off ratio,’
the ratio of the fall in price to the
dividend paid.
Hence:
Elton and Gruber (1970) show
that under the classical system, the
price-drop-to-dividend ratio (DOR) is
expected to equal the relative tax dif-
ferential between dividend and capital
gain, where m and z are the marginal
tax rate on dividend income and the
capital gain tax rate, respectively:
R
ex
 = (1 - DOR)                                       (16)
d
P
cum
DOR =                                        (17)
P
cum 
- P
ex
d
R
ex
 =                                        (15)
d + P
ex
 - P
cum
P
cum
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Lasfer (1995) develops a model
based on study by Elton and Gruber
above and under the UK imputation
system, the price-drop-to-dividend ra-
tio is as follows:
where s is the rate of imputation credit.
As discussed earlier, the main
impact of the 1997 dividend tax change
was to remove the ability of tax-ex-
empt investors such as pension funds
to reclaim tax credit, thereby decreas-
ing their dividend income by 20 per-
cent. Before the 1997 abolition of tax
credit (s= 0.20), if ex-dividend day
share price behavior were solely influ-
enced by the tax preference of tax-
exempt shareholders (marginal income
tax rate and capital gain tax are equal
to zero or m= z= 0), the drop-off ratio
would be equal to 1.25. Following the
1997 abolition of tax credit (s= 0), the
drop-off ratio would be expected to
fall by 20 percent. Therefore, if price-
drop-to-dividend ratios after the aboli-
tion were lower than before the aboli-
tion, then the ex-dividend day returns
should have increased following the
1997 abolition of the tax credit.
By comparing abnormal returns
on the ex-dividend days in the pre- and
post-abolition periods, we can investi-
gate the effect of the 1997 tax change
on the ex-dividend day abnormal re-
turns. The hypothesis to be tested is as
follows:
The 1997 abolition of the tax credit
on dividends had no effect on ex-
dividend day abnormal returns.
Data and Methodology
Data
Data on ex-dividend dates, divi-
dend per share, share prices, dividend
yield, market value of equity and mar-
ket index were collected to test the
impact of the 1997 abolition of tax-
credits on the ex-dividend day abnor-
mal returns. These data was obtained
from the London Stock Exchange
(Datastream International and Extel -
UK Annual Financial News Summary)
over the sample period of this study (1/
1/1995 to 31/12/1999). All cash divi-
dend distributions were collected in
the form of interim and final divi-
dends.
The main selection criterion is
that there should be at least 5 days
between the ex-dividend day and other
announcement days such as earnings,
stock splits and right issues. The rea-
son for this is that the ex-dividend
abnormal returns should not be con-
taminated by other announcement ef-
fects, a concern first raised by Miller
and Scholes (1982). Furthermore, the
DOR =                     =                    (18)
P
cum 
- P
ex
d
1 - m
1 - z
DOR =
=                                      (19)
P
cum 
- P
ex
d
1 - m
(1 - s)(1 - z)
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sample observations were chosen from
actively traded shares to reduce the
thin trading problems. Infrequently
traded shares have the potential for
resulting in biased estimates of abnor-
mal returns, and consequently unspeci-
fied tests statistics in the event study
(Strong 1992). A sample of 1,042 ob-
servations was selected in this study.
It is recognized that this data set
has encountered some limitations.
Since ownership data is very difficult
to obtain, the sample firms may not
represent institution portfolio holdings,
which provide important link to con-
nect the empirical results to institu-
tional investors such as pension funds.
Furthermore, even though the
number of observations (1,042) was
large, this came from 105 FT All Share
companies, thus the size of sample
firms was not huge. One problem when
dealing with stock prices is volatility
within the sample firms, and normally
this is exacerbated when the data
sample is not large. To investigate the
ex-dividend share price behavior in
relation to the actual dividend, this
sample was extended to 169 compa-
nies with 1,440 observations. This
study realizes that share prices are
very volatile and the variance of the
average price drop is therefore large.
The mean is significantly affected by
several outliers in the sample. In order
to measure the average price drop cor-
rectly, this study deleted these extreme
value from the observations. Due to
the extreme values, sixty (60) ex-divi-
dend day events were deleted. More-
over, since this study examines the
behavior of share prices on ex-divi-
dend day, zero-price-change observa-
tions were excluded from the sample,
and a further 34 ex-dividend day events
were eliminated. Eventually the final
sample of 1,346 ex-dividend day ob-
servations were used in the analysis of
price-drop to dividend ratios.
Methodology
In order to examine the effect of
the 1997 abolition of tax credits on the
behavior of share prices on the ex-
dividend days, this study analyses ab-
normal returns on ex-dividend days
over the period from 1 January 1995 to
31 December 1999. The market model
is used to measure abnormal returns.
To obtain coefficients of the market
model, security returns are regressed
against FT All Shares Index (-200:
-41) using trading days relative to ex-
dividend days. The rationale for using
a large number of observations (160
days) is to minimize the impact of
company specific events such as earn-
ings or right issue announcement on
the parameter estimates.
The market model equation is as
follows:
R
jt
 = 
j
 + 
j
R
mt
 + 
t
where:
R 
jt
= the daily security return for com-
pany j on day t

j
= the intercept for company

j
= beta for company j
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R
m t
= the daily return of FT All Shares
Index on day t, and

t
= the stochastic disturbance term
Once the parameters of the mar-
ket model equation have been esti-
mated, we use them to calculate pre-
dicted returns (R) for each company on
ex-dividend day. Abnormal returns
(AR) are calculated as indicated be-
low:
AR
jt
 = R
jt
 - R
jt
where:
AR
 jt
= abnormal return for company j
on day t
R 
jt
= the daily security return for
company j on day t
R
jt
= the estimated/predicted return
for company j on day t
To test for the significance of the
mean ex-dividend day abnormal re-
turns (AR 
j,ex 
), the standard deviation
of the residuals (market model) is used
to compute the standardized abnormal
return (SAR). The standardized ab-
normal returns are calculated using
Patell’s (1976) method. The SAR is
computed for ex-dividend day as fol-
lows:
where:
AR
 jt
= the abnormal return on day t
for company j
h
t
= (R
mt
 - R
m
)2
H =(h)
R
mt
= the market return on day t
R
m
= the average market return over
the estimation period
T
j
= the number of days in the esti-
mation period)

j
= the standard deviation of the
residuals (market model) dur-
ing the estimation period
These standardized abnormal re-
turns are aggregated to construct Z-
statistic as follows:
To examine the significance of the
mean ex-day abnormal returns, the
following hypotheses are tested:
H
o
: The ex-day Abnormal Return is
equal to zero (AR
 ex
= 0 )
H
a
: The ex-day Abnormal Return is
not equal to zero ( AR
 ex
 0 )
Since the null hypothesis of AR
ex
= 0 is tested against the alternative of
AR
ex
 0, the two-tailed statistical test
is used. For the conventional signifi-
cant level of 5 percent, the computed
Z-statistic is compared with Z
0.025
 which
is 1.96. The null hypothesis will be
rejected if the Z-statistic is greater
than 1.96.
v
v
v
T
i
=1
v
SAR
jt
 =
AR
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
j
     1 +      +
1       h
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j
      H
v
v
v
Z=
ARjt
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Finally, this study will conduct a
test on whether the 1997 abolition of
tax credit on dividend has changed the
ex-dividend day returns behavior. To
examine whether the 1997 abolition of
the tax credit on dividends had no
effect on ex-dividend day abnormal
returns, the two-tailed statistical test is
appropriate. To test for differences in
ex-day abnormal returns between two
samples, the standardized abnormal
returns (SAR
j,ex
) are split into pre-abo-
lition (1/1/1995 to 1/7/1997) and post-
abolition periods (2/7/1997 to 31/12/
1999) and following statistical hypoth-
eses are tested: H
o
 : µ
1
= µ 
2
 versus H
a
:
µ
1
 µ
2 
(where: µ
1
= the sample means
of SAR
1,ex
 for the pre-1997 abolition
period; and µ
2
= the sample means of
SAR
 2,ex
 for the post-1997 abolition
period).
The conventional significant level
of 5 percent is used to test this hypoth-
esis. The null hypothesis (H
o
) is re-
jected if  Z > Z

 and there is a
significant difference between the pre-
and post-abolition mean ex-dividend
day returns. This would imply that the
ex-dividend day returns changed fol-
lowing the 1997 abolition of tax credit
on dividend or in other words, ex-
dividend day abnormal returns were
affected by the abolition of tax credit
on dividends.
Empirical Tests and Results
This empirical study tests of the
significance of the mean ex-day ab-
normal returns over the pre-and post-
abolition periods. The pre-abolition
period includes the 2.5 years before
the abolition of tax credits on dividend
(1/1/1995 to 1/7/ 1997) and the post-
abolition includes the 2.5 years after
the abolition ( 2/7/1997 to 31/12/1999).
Ex- day abnormal returns (AR 
j ,ex
)
and standard deviation of the residuals
(market model) are used to compute
the standardized abnormal returns
(SAR). These standardized abnormal
returns are aggregated as in Patell
(1976) to construct Z-scores. To ex-
amine the significance of the mean ex-
day abnormal returns, a two-tailed sta-
tistical test is used since the null hy-
pothesis of AR
ex
= 0 is tested against
the alternative of AR
ex
 0. For the
conventional significance level of 5
percent, the computed Z-statistic is
compared with Z
0.025
 which is 1.96.
The null hypothesis is rejected if the
Z-statisticis greater than 1.96.
The difference in ex-day abnor-
mal returns between pre- and post-
abolition periods is also examined.
The two-sample mean test is employed
on the standardized abnormal returns
to test whether the abnormal returns
on ex-dividend day (AR
ex
) were af-
fected by the 1997 abolition of tax
credits on dividend. Since the null
hypothesis of AR
ex
 pre-abolition= AR
ex
post-abolition is tested against the al-
ternative of AR
ex
 post-abolition  AR
ex
pre-abolition, the two-tailed statistical
test is appropriate The conventional
significance level of 5 percent is used
to test this hypothesis. The null hy-
pothesis (H
o
) is rejected if Z > Z

 and
there is significant difference between
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the pre-and post-abolition mean ex-
dividend day returns.
Table 5 presents the results of
significance tests for mean ex-day ab-
normal returns. Abnormal returns on
ex-dividend days (AR
j, ex
) and their Z-
scores are provided for the pre- and
post-abolition of tax-credit periods.
To better explain the distribution of
AR
j,ex
, the percentage of positive val-
ues and the median values are pro-
vided in this table. Test results by
dividend yield quintiles are also pro-
vided for the pre-and post-abolition.
The mean ex-day abnormal re-
turns (hereafter, AR) for all quintiles
over the pre-abolition periods (1/1/
1995 to 1/7/1997) is 0.0580 percent
and over the post-abolition periods (2/
7/1997 to 31/12/1999) is -0.1459 per-
cent. This decline in abnormal returns
is confirmed by the median AR of
0.0299 percent over the pre-abolition
periods, declining to -0.0915 percent
during the post-abolition periods, and
by the percentage of positive AR de-
clining from 50.65 percent to 46.52
percent. The Z-score of the mean AR
Table 5.Ex-dividend Day Abnormal Returns –All Quintiles and  Per Quintile
Pre-Abolition Period (1/1/1995-1/7/1997)
DY N AR Z-Score Median  Percent
Positive
All quintiles 3.9699 541 0.0580 1.6850 0.0299 50.65 percent
Quintile 1 2.2330 107 0.0299 0.4689 -0.0230 46.73 percent
Quintile 2 3.1488 107 -0.0252 0.4502 0.0439 51.40 percent
Quintile 3 3.8489 116 0.0418 0.7672 -0.0126 50.00 percent
Quintile 4 4.5592 104 0.1452 1.2639 0.1717 53.85 percent
Quintile 5 6.0598 107 0.1091 0.8605 0.0765 53.27 percent
Post-Abolition Period (2/7/1997-31/12/1999)
DY N AR Z-Score Median  Percent
Positive
All quintiles 3.8546 501 -0.1459 -1.5599 -0.0915 46.52 percent
Quintile 1 1.8439 96 0.0032 -0.1867 -0.0659 47.92 percent
Quintile 2 2.9254 112 0.0726 0.4160 -0.0203 50.00 percent
Quintile 3 3.6341 99 -0.1272 -0.3532 -0.1278 43.43 percent
Quintile 4 4.4492 100 -0.0270 -0.5711 -0.1453 47.00 percent
Quintile 5 6.4203 94 -0.7174 -2.9678* -0.1592 42.55 percent
Notes: N is the number of observations
AR is the mean ex-day abnormal returns in percentage
Z is the statistical score for significance of the mean abnormal returns.
* The significance level of 5 percent for Z is 1.96
DY is the average dividend yield percentage
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for all quintiles over the pre-abolition
periods is an insignificant 1.6850 and
that for the post-abolition periods AR
is insignificant at -1.5599. These re-
sults appear to indicate that the 1997
abolition of tax credits resulted in lower
ex-day abnormal returns in the post-
abolition periods. To investigate
whether the ex-day abnormal returns
changed following the 1997 abolition
of tax credits, this study conducts com-
parison tests.
The results of comparison test
between two sample periods are pre-
sented in Table 6. The comparison of
ex-day abnormal returns between pre-
and post-abolition periods shows that
ex-day returns declined significantly
following the 1997 abolition of tax
credits (t-value= 2.0431). Thus the
hypothesis that ex-dividend day ab-
normal returns did not change follow-
ing the 1997 abolition of tax credit can
be rejected at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level. In other words, the ex-
dividend day returns were affected by
the 1997 tax reform. Through the abo-
lition of tax credit paid to pension
funds and companies in 1997, the
United Kingdom government at-
tempted to use the tax system to en-
courage lower dividends and the ex-
day returns declined following the new
regulation.
To provide further evidence on
the ex-day abnormal returns, Table 7
reports test results for individual years
from 1995 to 1999. These results show
that the Z-scores for 1995, 1996, 1997
and 1998 are insignificant. The 1999
AR, -0.3179 percent, is the only sig-
nificant result with Z-score -2.2877.
The two-sample tests presented in
Table 6 also indicate that the 1999 AR
is significantly less than the 1995, the
1996 and 1997 AR. This evidence
shows that the ex-day abnormal re-
turns declined following the abolition
of tax credits on dividend.
The decline in the ex-day abnor-
mal returns (AR) for the post-abolition
periods seems to be driven primarily
by the highest dividend yield quintile.
Table 5 shows that the mean AR for
Table 6.Comparison of Ex-Day Abnormal Returnsin Two Samples
Post-Abolition 1996 1997 1998 1999
Pre-Abolition 2.0431*
1995 0.4644 -0.1886 0.8096 2.4348 *
1996 -0.6219 0.4571 1.9697 *
1997 0.9244 2.4525 *
1998 1.0157
Notes: Mean AR of different time periods are compared using the two-sample test
* Italic number is significant at the 5 percent level
Pre-Abolition: 1/1/1995- 1/7/1997
Post-Abolition: 2/7/1997-31/12/1999
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quintile 5, 0.1091 percent, is insignifi-
cantly positive (Z-score = 0.8605) dur-
ing pre-abolition periods and it drops
to -0.7174 percent (significantly nega-
tive with Z-score= -2.9678) over the
post-abolition periods. This result ap-
pears to suggest that the highest divi-
dend yield securities are likely to be
held by tax-exempt investors such as
pension funds that were affected by
the 1997 abolition of the tax credits on
dividend. This decline can be expected
to describe the decline for the aggre-
gate results of post-abolition periods.
Further investigation of the ex-
dividend share price behavior in rela-
tion to the actual dividend paid may
provide additional evidence to the ear-
lier findings reported above. This is
best done using Elton and Gruber‘s
(1970) drop off ratios techniques. The
analysis of share price movement
around the ex-dividend day compares
the share-price drop to the dividend
per share. As described earlier, the rate
of return on the ex-dividend day is
composed of a dividends component
and a capital gain (loss) component.
The equation is:
Table 7. Ex-dividend Day Abnormal Returns Per Year
Data DY N AR Z-Score Median  Percent
Positive
1995 4.0102 215 0.0303 1.0481 0.0630 50.70 percent
1996 3.9572 217 0.0192 0.4537 -0.0134 49.31 percent
1997 (str. 1) 3.9150 109 0.1969 1.6771 0.1067 54.13 percent
1997 (str. 2) 3.8041 106 0.0165 0.3022 0.0551 51.89 percent
1998 3.8202 183 -0.0471 -0.3864 -0.0947 45.36 percent
1999 3.9142 212 -0.3179 -2.2877* -0.1853 43.40 percent
Total 1042
Observation
Notes:
str= semester
N is the number of observations
AR is the mean ex-day abnormal returns in percentage
Z is the statistical score for significance of the mean abnormal returns
DY is the average dividend yield percentage*
* Italic number is significant at the 5 percent level
Pre-Abolition: 1/1/1995-1/7/1997
Post-Abolition: 2/7/1997-31/12/1999
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Table 8. Price-Drop to Dividend Ratios (Drop Off Ratios)
Pre-Abolition Period (1/1/1995-1/7/1997)
DY N DOR (Mean) Variance
All quintiles 3.753 733 0.519 0.108
Quintile 1 1.706 125 0.665 0.203
Quintile 2 2.904 154 0.516 0.132
Quintile 3 3.682 157 0.467 0.063
Quintile 4 4.471 151 0.483 0.082
Quintile 5 6.069 146 0.491 0.055
Post-Abolition Period (2/7/1997-31/12/1999)
DY N DOR (Mean) Variance
All quintiles 3.708 613 0.574 0.305
Quintile 1 1.375 84 0.761 0.255
Quintile 2 2.602 133 0.567 0.688
Quintile 3 3.471 119 0.533 0.230
Quintile 4 4.449 142 0.505 0.145
Quintile 5 6.731 135 0.575 0.172
Notes: N is number of observations (total observation = 1,346)
DOR is the average ex-dividend drop-off ratio
DY is the average dividend yield
The ex-dividend day drop-off ra-
tios
were computed before and after the
1997 abolition of tax credit on divi-
dend. If price-drop-to-dividend ratios
after the abolition were greater than
before the abolition, then the ex-divi-
dend day returns should have declined
following the 1997 abolition of the tax
credit.
This study is aware that share
prices are very volatile and the vari-
ance of the average price drop is there-
fore large. The mean is significantly
affected by several outliers in the
sample. In order to measure the aver-
age price drop correctly, this study
deleted these extreme value from the
observations. As mentioned earlier,
the initial sample was 1,042 observa-
tions from 105 companies. This was
extended to 169 companies with 1,440
observations. Due to the extreme val-
ues, sixty (60) ex-dividend day events
were deleted. Moreover, since this
R
ex
=                        or alternatively
d + P
ex 
-P
cum
P
cum
R
ex
= (1 - DOR)
d
P
cum
DOR
ex
=
P
cum 
- P
ex
D
222
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May-August 2006, Vol. 8, No. 2
study examines the behavior of share
prices on ex-dividend day, zero-price-
change observations were excluded
from the sample, and a further 34 ex-
dividend day events were eliminated.
Eventually the final sample of 1,346
ex-dividend day observations were
used in this analysis.
Table 8 presents the average ex-
dividend day drop-off ratios for the
pre-and post-abolition periods. The
results by dividend yield quintiles are
also provided for the pre-and post-
abolition.
The mean ex-dividend day drop-
off ratios (DOR) for all quintiles over
the pre-abolition periods is 0.519 and
over the post-abolition periods is 0.574.
The comparison of price-drop to divi-
dend ratios between pre-and post-abo-
lition periods shows that drop-off ra-
tios increased following the 1997 abo-
lition of tax credits. The mean drop-off
ratios for dividend yield group 1,2,3,4
and 5 increased, respectively, from
0.665, 0.516, 0.467, 0.483, and 0.491
in the pre-abolition period to 0.761,
0.567, 0.533, 0.505 and 0.575 in the
post-abolition period. These results
appear to indicate that the 1997 aboli-
tion of tax credits resulted in greater
drop off ratios in the post-abolition
periods.
To investigate whether the ex-day
drop off ratios changed following the
1997 abolition of tax credits, this study
conducts comparison tests. The results
of comparison test between two sample
periods are presented in Table 9.
The comparison tests of ex-day
drop-off ratios between pre-and post-
abolition periods shows that drop-off
ratios for all dividend yield groups
increased significantly after the 1997
abolition of tax credits (t-value= 2.183).
The increase in the ex-day DOR for the
post-abolition periods seems to be
driven primarily by the highest divi-
dend yield quintile. Table 9 shows that
the mean DOR for quintile 5 is 0.491
during pre-abolition periods and it in-
creases significantly to 0.575 over the
Table 9.Comparison Tests of DOR between Two Sample Periods
DY DOR DOR Difference T-Stat
Pre-Abolition Post-Abolition
All quintiles 0.519 0.574 0.055 2.183 *
Quintile 1 0.665 0.761 0.096 1.406
Quintile 2 0.516 0.567 0.052 0.666
Quintile 3 0.467 0.533 0.066 1.368
Quintile 4 0.483 0.505 0.022 0.547
Quintile 5 0.491 0.575 0.084 2.074 *
Notes: Mean DOR of different time periods are compared using the two-sample test
* Italic number is significant at the 5 percent level
Pre-Abolition: 1/1/1995- 1/7/1997
Post-Abolition: 2/7/1997-31/12/1999
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post-abolition periods with t-value of
2.074.
This evidence is consistent with
the previous findings that the 1997
abolition of tax credit on dividend re-
sulted in lower ex-dividend day re-
turns in the post-abolition periods than
they were in the pre-abolition periods.
Thus, the decrease on ex-day abnor-
mal returns was further supported by a
significant increase in the average
price-drop to dividend ratios.
Summary and Conclusions
This study investigates the effect
of the 1997 abolition of tax credit on
the ex-day abnormal returns because
the new tax regulation has an impor-
tant implication for the analysis of ex-
dividend returns. Since investors such
as pension funds and other tax-exempt
institutions are no longer entitled to
the payment of tax credits, the effec-
tive rate of income tax increased sig-
nificantly. Consequently, the amount
of dividend received by tax-exempt
investors declined considerably, ceteris
paribus, then the ex-day abnormal re-
turns were expected to decline.
To test whether the ex-day abnor-
mal returns changed following the 1997
abolition of tax credits, this study uses
1042 LSE ex-day observations over
the pre-abolition periods (1/1/1995 -
1/7/1997) and the post-abolition peri-
ods (2/7/1997-31/12/1999). The ex-
day AR declined from 0.0580  percent
during the pre-abolition periods to -
0.1459  percent during the post-aboli-
tion periods. This decline in abnormal
returns is confirmed by the median AR
of 0.0299 percent over the pre-aboli-
tion periods, declining to -0.0915 per-
cent during the post-abolition periods,
and by the percentage of positive AR
declining from 50.65 percent to 46.52
percent. The result of comparison test
between pre-and post abolition peri-
ods shows that the ex-day abnormal
returns declined significantly with a t-
value of 2.0431. From these results, it
would appear that the ex-dividend day
abnormal returns changed following
the 1997 abolition of tax credits on
dividend. This decrease in the ex-day
abnormal returns was further supported
by a significant increase in the average
price-drop to dividend ratios. The av-
erage ex-day drop-off ratios (DOR)
for all dividend yield groups increased
significantly from 0.519 in the pre-
abolition period to 0.574 in the post-
abolition period with t-value of 2.183.
The decline in the ex-day AR for
the post-abolition periods seems to be
driven primarily by quintile 5 (the high-
est dividend yield quintile). Quintile 5
exhibits strong dividend preference and
this preference is likely caused by the
imputation system that provides a tax
advantage to the pension funds and
other tax exempt shareholders. Statis-
tical results show that the mean AR for
quintile 5, 0.1091 percent, is insignifi-
cantly positive (Z-score = 0.8605) dur-
ing pre-abolition periods and it drops
to -0.7174 percent (significantly nega-
tive with Z-score= -2.9678) over the
post-abolition periods. This result ap-
pears to suggest that the highest divi-
dend yield securities are likely to be
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held by tax-exempt investors such as
pension funds that were affected by
the 1997 abolition of the tax credits on
dividend.
This study recognizes that it
encounteres some limitations. Firstly,
since ownership data is very difficult
to obtain, the sample firms may not
represent institution portfolio holdings,
which provide important link to con-
nect the empirical results to institu-
tional investors such as pension funds.
Secondly, even though the number of
observations was large, this came from
105 companies, thus the size of sample
firms was not huge. One problem when
dealing with stock prices is volatility
within the sample firms, and normally
this is exacerbated when the data
sample is not large. Thus, these factors
may reduce the strength of the findings
of this empirical study.
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